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In 1993, the United States Su­
preme Court in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Phannaceuticals, Inc. 1 over­
ruled the general acceptance stan­
dard set forth in Frye v. United 
States, 2 a 1923 decision by the 
D.C. Circuit. In its place, the Court 
substituted a reliability test for de­
termining the admissibility of sci­
entific e v i dence. T h e  Frye 
standard had been the majority rule 
in both federal and state courts 
until Daubert. This article dis­
cusses the reactions of state courts 
to the Daubert decision. 
Daubert rests on an interpretation 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence,3 
a..nd therefore as a statutory, rather 
than a constitutional, case, it is not 
binding on the states. This is true 
even in the forty jurisdictions that 
have adopted evidence rules based 
on the Federal Rules.4 For exarriple, 
*Albert J. Weatherhead In & Rich­
ard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, 
Case Western Reserve University. This 
column is based in part on P. Giannelli 
& E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 
C?d ed. 1993). Reprinted with permis­
siOn. 
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma­
ceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 570 (1993). 
2 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 1923). 
3 509 U.S. at 587 ("We interpret the 
legislatively-enacted Federal Rules of 
Evidence as we would any statute. "). 
4 See Joseph & Saltzburg, The Fed­
eral Rules of Evidence in the States iii 
(1992) (preface). 
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the Arizona Supreme Court has de­
clined to follow Daubert, noting that 
it was "not bound by the United 
States Supreme Court's non-consti­
tutional constmction of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence when we construe 
the Arizona Rules ·of Evidence."5 
The Court went o� to remark: "Our 
rules ... are court-enacted. While 
the United States Supreme Court 
considers congressional purpose, 
this court-\:vh·en const.nJing a rtlle 
we have adopted-must rely on text 
a..nd our own intent in adopting or 
amending the rule in the first in­
stance."6 Similarly, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court has commented: 
"[I\J]otwithstanding that our rule 702 
parallels. the federal r u le 702, 
Daubert does not apply to state court 
decisions. The increasing prevalence 
of expert evidence cautions against 
·the adrrjssion of scientific evidence 
which is still the subject of dispute 
and controversy in the relevant sci­
entific communities .... We thus 
adhere to the F;ye staildard .. . .  "7 
fP!rtreQ!IJaul/Jerfl Apprt«:»aJch!res 
An understanding of the post­
Daubert developments requires 
5 State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 
(Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 
1046 (1994). 
6 Id. 
7 State v. Dean, 523 N.W.2d 681, 
692-93 (l'Teb. 1994). 
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some appreciatiOn of the pre­
Dauberi case hi.w. At the time 
, Daubert carne before the Supreme 
Court, there were four approaches 
to the admissibility of scientific evi­
dence in this country. First, a ma­
jority of jurisdictions followed the 
Frye general acceptance test, includ­
ing most federal circuit courts. Sec­
ond, a number of courts had rejected 
Frye, adopting a relevancy test. Un,. 
der this view, if the expert was quali­
fied, the underlying technique used 
by that expert was also qualified. In 
practice, this approach often left the 
reliability issue to the jury. 
In the 1980s, a third position be­
gan to develop, one that rejected 
Frye but required a judicial deter­
mination of reliability. This reliabil­
ity approach was more stringent than 
the relevancy approach. Under this 
approach, the trial court was re­
quired to go beyond the expert's 
qualifications and scrutinize the re­
liability of the underlying scienti fic 
technique. This approach was the 
precursor at the Supreme Court's 
decision in Daubert. 
Finally, an approach labelled 
"Frye plus" surfaced in some D N A  
cases. This approach is not an alter­
native that replaces Frye, but rather 
it adds a further element to the Frye 
test. Moreover, it is not necessarily 
tied to the Frye rule. Indeed, some 
recent decisions may be described 
as "Daubert plus." 
· Frye v. United States 
Numerous state courts continue 
to apply the Frye test post-Daubert. 
Since 1993, Fryehas been applied 
to a wide range. of scientific tech­
niques in criminal cases, including 
Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) 
155 
testing, 8 battered women syndrome,9 
and intoxication testing10 (including · 
the horizontal gaze n ystagmus 
test).11 Frye has also been applied to 
various aspects of D N A  evidence: 
RL F P, 12 P CR, 1 3  binning, 1 4  band-
8 Commonwealth v. Khamphouse­
ane, 642 A.2d 490, 492 (Pa. Super.) 
(Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) test­
ing to establish paternity in a statutory 
rape case generally accepted), appeal 
denied, 649 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1994). 
9 State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 48-50 
(Wash. 1994) (en bane) (battered per­
son syndrome generally acc.epted but 
only in a long-term relationship). 
10 See war v. Surn.rllerdale, 601 So. 2d 
198, 200 .(Ala. Crim.  App. 1992) 
(Intoxilyzer 5000 generally accepted). 
11 E.g., People v. Lea.l:!y, 882 P.2d 
321, 334 (Cal. 1994) ("[T]estimony by 
police officers regarding the mere ad­
ministration of the HGN test is insuffi­
cient to meet the general acceptance 
standard . . .  "); State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 
1110, 1121 (Kan. 1992) (HG� "evi­
dence requires a Frye foundation for 
admissibility."); State v. Klawitter, 518 
N.W.2d 577, 585 (Minn. 1994) (HGN 
satisfies Frye). 
· 
12 E.g., State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 
502, 512 (Wash. 1993) (General sci­
entific theory underlying DNA iden­
tifications and the RFLP test generally 
accepted in the relevant scientific 
communities). 
13 E.g., State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 
763, 783 (Neb. 1994) (DNA-PCR DQ 
alpha statistical probability calculations 
not generally accepted); State v. 
Russell, 882 P.2d 747,768 (Wash. 1994) 
(PCR-DQ alpha generally accepted; the 
Cetus kit is only one means of PCR test­
ing and need not be shown to be gener­
ally accepted), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 
1129 (1995). 
14 E.g., People v. Venegas, 36 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 856, 864--66 (Cal. App. 1995) 
(prosecution failed to establish that FBI 
"binning" method and statistical calcu­
lations satisfy Frye; reliability of Cell- · 
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shifting, 15 statistical calculations, 16 
and the ceiling principle.17 
Many important jurisdictions 
still  adhere to the Frye rule: 
Alaska, 18 California, 19 Colorado,20 
Florida,21 Illinois,22 Kansas,23 
mark DNA method in prior case did not 
automatically apply to FBI method). 
15 Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257, 
262, 264 (Fla. 1995) ("Florida utilizes 
the Frye test"; courts may take judiCial 
notice on some aspects of DNA, but 
conecting for band-shifting is not gen­
erally accepted),: 
16 E.g., State v. Sivri, 646 A.2d 169, 
189-92 (Conn. 1994) (while DNA evi­
dence generallfaccepted, case remanded 
to decide if population frequency calcu­
lations are generally accepted); Lindsey 
v. People, 892 P.2d 281 (Colo. 1995)(en 
bane) (DNA population statistics gener­
ally accepted under Frye). 
17 E.g:, State v. Buckner, 890 P.2d 
460, 462 (Wash. 1995) (en bane) (sta­
tistics based on ceiling principle gener­
ally accepted but testimony that only 
one Caucasian in 19.25 billion (four 
times the present population of the 
E arth) inadmissible); State v. Bloom, 
516 N.W.2d. 159, 167 (Minn. 1994) 
(random match probability based of in­
terim ceiling met.hod ad!Ilissible ). 
18 Harmon v.State, 908 P.2d 434, 
440-41 (Alaska 1995) (DNA evidence, 
both RFLP and PCR, satisfies the Frye 
test; statistical a.nalysis accompanying 
each form of DNA testing also gener­
ally accepted). 
19 E.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 
321, 331 (Cal. 1994) (The "Kelly for­
mulation [of Frye under Cal. Evid. 
Code] survived Daubert ... "). 
20 Lindsey v. People, 892 P.2d 281, 
288 (Colo. 1995) (en bane) (applying 
Frye; DNA statistics generally accepted 
despite "subgroup" debate) (noting 
Daubert "issue not now before us"). 
21 Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 
829 n.2 (Fla. 1993) (Despite Daube11, 
"Florida continues to adhere to the Fiye 
test."). 
22 People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721 
(Til. 1996) ("Illinois follows the F1]'e 
standard for the admission of novel sci­
entific evidence."). 
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Maryland,24 Nebraska,25 Nevv 
York/6 and WashingtonY Some 
Frye jurisdictions, however, have 
not definitively rejected Daubert, 
but have merely postponed consid­
eration of the issue.28 In other cases, 
intermediate appellate courts have 
felt bound to apply Frye until their 
respective state supreme courts 
speak on the issue.29 
23 State v. Hill, 895 P.2d 1238, 1245 
(Kan. 1995) ("Kansas has repeatedly 
applied Frye.''). 
24 United States c;:Jypsum Co. v. Bal­
timore, 647 A.2d 405, 423 (Md. 1994) 
(asbestos evidence). 
25 State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763, 
783, 779 (Neb. 1994) ("[W]e decline to 
adopt the less demanding Daubert stan­
dard and reaffirm Frye as the standard 
for determining the admissibility of 
DNA evidence."). 
26 People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 
455-56 (N.Y. 1994) (Lifecodes DNA 
method generally accepted; visual 
matching accepted by scientific com­
munity in 1988). 
27 State v. Riker, 869 P. 2d 43, 48 n.l 
(Wash. 1994) (en bane) (Court will 
"continue to adhere to the view that the 
F1]'e analysis is a threshold inquiry to 
be considered in determining the admis­
sibility of evidence under E R  702 "; 
however, "many of the 'general obser­
vations' made [in Daubert] may be of 
use to trial judges in making the thresh­
old F1]'e determination."). 
28 Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 
k2d 395,400 n.2 (Pa. 1994) ("Daubert 
relaxes, somewhat, the impediments to 
admission of novel scientific evidence. 
. . .  ·whether or not the rationale of 
Daubert will supersede or modify the 
F1]'e test in Pennsylvania is left to an­
other day."). 
29 State v. Cissne, 865 P.2d 564, 569 
(Wash. App. 1994) ("[U]ntil such time 
as our Supreme Court abandons F1]'e 
and interprets ER 702 in the same man­
ner as Daubert Fed. R. Evict. 702, we 
are bound by . . .  previous decision."). 
FORENSIC SCIENCE 
In defending its decision to ad­
here to Frye, the Washington Su­
preme Court made the following 
comment: 
The State maintains that this 
court should abandon Frye and 
adopt Daubert. The Stat� argues 
that Frye is difficult to apply. While 
Frye may be difficult to apply in 
some contexts, this is a result of the 
are supported by a qualified expert 
witness should be received unless 
there are other reasons for exclu­
sion. Particularly, its probative 
. value may be overborne by the fa­
miliar dangers of prejudicing or 
misleading the jury, unfair surprise 
and undue consumption of timeY 
I . ' comp extty of the partiCular sci- · 
The balancing of probative value 
against other factors such as mis­
l eadin g the jury,  of which 
McCormick spoke, is comparable 
to present Federal Rule 403. In 
practice, however, this approach 
might be quite different. Since most 
trial judges do not possess the sci­
entific background todetermine rel­
evance/reliability, the judge "will 
ence at issue, the extent tci which 
. the scientific community has 
made its view known, and the 
extent of any dispute in the sci­
entific community. The same, or 
similar problems, arise under 
Daubert, including questions of 
testability, the extent to which the 
scientific technique or method is 
accepted by the scientific commu­
nity, and drawing the line between 
legitimate science and "junk" sci­
ence, along with other questions. 
Questions of admissibility of com­
plex, controversial scientific tech­
niques or methods, like those 
involving DNA evidence, are going 
to be difficult under either standard.30 
Relevancy Approach 
In his 1954 evidence text, Profes­
sor Charles McCormick criticized 
the Frye test. In his view: 
"General scientific acceptance" is 
a proper condition upon the court's 
taking judicial notice of scientific 
facts, but not a criterion for the 
admissibility of scientific evidence. 
Any relevant conclusions which 
30 State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1'304, 
1314 (Wash. 1996) (en bane). 
- generally be forced to accept the 
probative value of the evidence as 
what a qualified expert testifies it to 
be."32 In effect, qualifying the expert 
presumptively qualifies the tech­
nique. This is too lax a standard for 
criminal cases. Moreover, "[t]he 
major flaw in the relevancy analy­
sis ... is its failure to recognize the 
distinctive problems of scientific 
evidence, "33 
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Daubert implicitly rejects this 
approach. The United States Su­
preme Court emphasized: "That the 
Frye test was displaced by the Rules 
of Evidence does not mean: how­
ever, that the Rules themselves place 
no limits on the admissibility of sci-
3 1 McCormick, Evidence 363-64 
(1954) .. 
32 _sn;o��· "Ques?ons Affecting the 
Adnusstbthty of Scientific Evidence," 
1970 U. TIL L.F. 1, 22. 
33 Giannelli, "The Admissibility of 
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States, A Half-Century Later," 
80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1250 (1980). 
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entific evidence. Nor is the trial 
judge disabled from screening such 
evidence. To the contrary, under the 
Rules the trial judge fuust ensure that 
any and all scientific testimony or 
evidence· admitted is not only rel­
evant, but reliabie;"34 
R�spit� JLO:UQlJJJ, s_<?m�_fsmrts 
still follow th1s approach.�For- �x­
ample, in State v. Peters35 the Wis­
consin Court of Appeals,
· 
in 
upholding the admissibility of DNA 
evidence, stated that Wisconsin fol­
lowed neither Frye nor Daubert: . 
"Once the relevancy of the evi­
dence is established and .the. wit­
ness is qualified. as an expert, the 
reliability of the evidence is a 
weight and credibility issue for the 
fact finder and any reliability chal­
lenges must b e  made through 
cross-examination or b y  other 
means of impeachment"36 
In State v. Donner,31 an intoxiCa­
tion case, the same court wrote: 
[B ]efore Daubert, the Frye test was 
not the law in Wisconsin. To that 
ex tent,  Wisconsin law a n d  
Daubert coincide. Beyond that, 
W isconsin law holds that "any 
relevant conclusions which are 
supported by a qualified witness 
should be received unless there 
are other reasons for exclusion." 
34 509 U.S. at 589.· 
35 State v. P eters, 534 N.W.2d 867 
(Wis. App. 1995) (DNA admissible 
notwithstanding the absence of Native 
Americans from the· database· used to 
project the likelihood of a coincidental 
DNA match), rev. denied, 537 N.W.2d 
572 (Wis. 1995). 
36 Id. at 873. 
37 State v. Donner, 531 N.W.2d 369 
(Wis. App. 1995), rev. denied, 534 
N.S.2d 86 (Wis. 1995). 
Stated otherwise, expert testimony 
is admissible in Wisconsin if rel­
evant and will be excluded only if 
the testimony is superfluous or a 
waste of time. 
Assuming that Daubert in its 
application represents something 
beyond Walstad, we observe that 
. we . . .  are bound to follow our su­
preme court case law. 38 
In sum, Daubert not only rejects 
Frye but the relevancy test as well. 
Reliability Approach 
A number of jurisdictions have 
explicitly rejected Frye in favor of 
the Daubert approach-for ex­
ample, Connecticut, 39 Indiana, 40 
Kentucky, 41 Massachusetts, 42 New 
38 Id. at 3 74 (quoting State v. 
Walstad, 351 N.W.2d 469, 487 (Wis. 
1984)): 
39 State v. Porter, 694 A.2d 1262 
(Conn. 1997) (polygraph). 
. 40 Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 
. 498 (Irid. 1995} ("The concerns driv­
. ing Daubert coincide with the express 
requirement of Indiana Rule of Evi-
dence 702(b) that the trial court be sat­
isfied of the reliability of the scientific 
principles involved. Thus, although not 
binding upon the determination of state 
evidentiary law issues, the federal evi­
dence law of Daubert and its progeny 
is helpful to the bench and bar in ap­
plying Indiana Rule of Evidence 
702(b)."); McGrew v. State, 673 N.E.2d 
787, 800 (Ind. App. 1996) ("[T]he State 
failed to present any evidence to satisfy 
the first three prongs of Daubert."). 
41 Cecil v. Commonwealth, 888 
S.W.2d 669, 675 (Ky. 1994) (clinical 
psychologist testimony on mens rea 
properly admitted under Daubert). 
42 Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 
N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) ("We 




Mexico,43 Oklahoma,44 South Da­
kota,45 Texas,46 and West Virginia.47 
Even before Daubert, however, 
courts in non-Frye jurisdictions had 
adopted a type of "reliability" ap� 
proach. For example, in 1984 the 
Oregon Supreme Court rejected the 
Frye test, but then went on to ex­
clude polygraph evidence under the 
Oregon Rules of Evidence�48 Loui­
siana applied a comparable analysis 
in polygraph and voice stress analy­
sis cases.49 Similarly, courts ex-
43 State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 
(N.M. 1993). 
44 Taylor v. State, 889 P.2q 319, 328, 
332 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("[T]he 
·time is right for this court to abandon 
the Frye test and adopt the more struc­
tured artd yet flexible admissibility stan­
dard set forth in Daubert.") .. 
45 State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 
484 (SD. 1994) ("[G]eneral acceptance 
in the scientific community is no longer 
required.") (intoxilyzer). 
46 E.l.Du P ont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex. 
1995) (commenting that Daubert prop" 
erly strengthens the role of trial judge 
as gatekeeper in civil cases). 
47 Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S,E.2d 196, 
203-4 (W.Va. 1993) ("Daubert's analy­
sis of Federal Rule 702 should be fol­
lowed in analyzing the admissibiiity of 
expert testirpony under 702 of West 
VrrginiaRules of Evidence."), cert. de­
nied, 115 S. Ct. 1129 (1994). 
48 State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751,775 
(Or. 1984) (en bane) ("Notwithstanding 
the usual deference to trial court dis­
cretion, we as an appellate court retain 
our role to determine the admissibility 
of scientific evidence under the Oregon 
Evidence Code."). 
49 State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 
981 (La. 1979) ("[A]fter engaging in a 
balancing process at the appellate Jevel 
sirriilar to that recommended by 
McCormick and other writers, we con-
i59 
eluded truth-serum evidence on this 
basis.50 
Post-Daubert cases falling into 
this category include: Arkansas, 51 
Delaware, 52 Georgia, 53 Iowa, 54 Loui­
siana,55 Montana, 56 North Carolina, 57 
elude that at present in our court sys­
tem the probative value [of polygraph 
evidence] is so outweighed by the rea­
sons for its exclusion that the evidence 
should not be admitted . . . .  "); State v. 
Thompson, 381 So. 2d 823, 824 (La. 
1980) (rejecting voice stress analysis) . 
. 50Harper v.State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 
395-96 (Ga. 1982) (rejecting Ftye rule 
but nevertheless excluding truth serum 
evidence as unreliable). 
51 Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 
294 (Ark. 1996) (DNA evidence no 
longer novel; "Daubert . . .  adopted a 
reliability approach to Rule 702, com­
parable to the relevancy approach of 
Prater in which reliability is the criti­
cal element."). · 
52 Nelson v. State; 628 A.2d 69, 73-
75 (Del. 1993) ("Our decisions [in prior 
cases] are consistent with the Supreme 
Court's decision in Daubert."). 
53 Carr v. State, 482 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. 
1997) (dog alert to fire accelerants riot 
shown "with verifiable certainty" to be 
accurate and reliable). 
54 Hutchison v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co.,. 514 N.W.2d 882, 885 
(Iowa 1994) (Daubert consistent with 
Iowa precedents) .. 
. 55 State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 
1123-27 (La. 1993) ("Past decisions of 
this court have espoused similar senti­
ments [as Daubert]."). 
56 State v. Moore, 885 P.2!1 457, 471 
(Mont. 1994). ("[T]he guidelines set 
forth in Daubert are consistent with our 
previous holding . . . concerning the 
admission of experttestitnony of novel 
scientific evidence, and we, therefore, 
adopt the Daubert standard."). 
57 State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631 
(N.C. 1995) (bloodstain pattern inter­
pretation admissible under North Caro-
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
Oregon,58 Utah,59 Vermont,60 and 
Wyoming. 61 Consequently, Daubert 
did not have much of an effect in 
these jurisdictions, except to the ex­
tent that it moved a state from the 
less stringent relevancy approach to 
the reliability approach. In contrast, 
inState"lLkO_Sl!-]62 the litah:�\lPS.§In� 
Court indicated th at its reliability ap­
proach was more stringent than the 
one required by Daubert. The Court 
wrote: 
If there is a noteworthy difference . 
between the two opinions, it is per­
haps that Ollr.opiqjgp !JJ BiiJJ_nu.i§ch 
provides a detailed· and rigorous 
outline for trial courts· to follow 
when making .detei:minations con­
cerning the adnlissibility of scien­
tific evidence . . . . "[T]be triaicourt · 
should carefully explore each logi­
cal link in the chain that leads to 
expert testimony given in court and 
determine its reliability. "} The Su­
preme Court in Daubert, on the 
lina approach which is consistent with 
Daubert). 
58 State v. O'Key, 899 P,2d 663, 680 
(Or. 1995) (en bane) ("Both l)aubert 
and Brown allow Frye's 'general accep­
tance' standard to be considered as one 
factor in the trial court's decision about 
adnussihility . . . Faced with a proffer 
of expert scientific testimony, an Or­
egon trial court . . .  should find Daubert 
instructive"; HGN intoxication· test is 
scientifically valid). 
59 State v. Cosby, 927 P. 2d 638, 642 
(Uta)j 1996). · 
. 6
0 State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226 (Vt. 
1993) (Daubert consistent with Ver­
mont precedents). · 
61 Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 
442-43 (Wyo. 1993). 
62 State v. Cosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 
1996). 
160 
other hand, e mphasized a more 
flexible approach . . . . ).63 
Frye "Plus" & Daubert 
"Plus" 
Before Daubert was decided, sev­
enil courts had applied a Frye-plus 
tesL64For example, in People v. 
Castro,65 the court set forth a three­
pronged analysis for the admissibil­
ity of scientific evidence. The 
proponent must show that ( 1) the un­
derlying theory has been generally 
accepted, (2) the procedures imple­
menting the thepry have been gen­
erally accepted', and (3) the testing 
laboratory has followed these pro� 
cedures. Because of the "complex­
ity " of DNA analysis and its  
"powerful impact" on a jury, the 
court held that "passing muster un­
der Frye alone is insufficient." In the 
court's view, the prosecution satis­
fied the first two prongs but not the 
third. Daubert, Frye, and the rel­
evancy apprpach all relate only to 
the first two prongs. 
Note, however, that this require­
ment predated the DN A cases. In a 
1971 case involving chromato­
graphic ink analysis, the court 
stated: "It is widely recognized that 
the party offering the results oflabo­
ratocy tests must . . . vouch for its 
correct administration in the particu­
lar case."66 Moreover, this founda-
63 Id. at 642 (quoting State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 403 (Utah 
1989)). 
64 Goldberg, "A New Day for 
DNA?," 78A .B .A . J. 84,84 (Apr. 1992) 
("Frye Plus"). 
65 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 
985, 987 (Sup. 1989). 
66 United States v. Bruno, 333 F. 
Supp. 570,574 (E. D. Pa. 1971). 
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. tional requirement is applied daily 
in intoxication and radar.·cases.67 
W hile the Alabama and Nebraska 
Supreme Courts adopted the three­
prong test,68 the federal courts split 
. on the issue. In United States v. Two 
Bulls, 69 the Eighth Circuit adopted 
the Castro approach. In contrast, the 
Second Circuit, which had earlier 
rejected Frye, also rejected this "el-
67. See 1 Giannelli & Imwinkelried, 
Scientific Evidence 36 (2d ed. 1993) 
(listing cases involving polygraph and 
. voiceprint as well as. other types of 
scientific evidence that adopt this 
position}. 
68 See also Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 
2d 242, 249-50 (Ala. 1991) (adopting 
the thfee-pronged test) ("lJTthis particu­
lar case, did the testing laboratory per­
form generally accepted scientific 
teChniq)leS without. error in the perfor­
mance or interpretation of the tests?"); 
Ex parte Hutcherson, 677 So. 2d 1205, 
1209 (Ala . 1996) ("[T]he testimony 
from forensic scientist Elaine Scott 
failed to satisfy the third prong of the 
Perry test because she did not testify as 
to the quality controls used by the Mo­
bile laboratory [for DNA].Additionally, 
testimony from Roger Morrison failed 
to sufficiently meet the thj.rd prong, be­
cause he explained only, one type of 
quality control procedure used and did 
not. testify as to other quality control 
procedures used . . .. ");State v. Houser, 
490 N .W.2d 168, 181 (Neb. 1992) 
("[TJhe trial court, in de�ermining ad­
missjbilityofDNA evidence, must first 
be satisfied, and find, as to the general 
acceptance of relevant DNAtheories in 
the scientific community and must be 
satisfied as to the acceptance and va­
lidity of the methodology of testing 
DNA used. The trial court then deter­
mines if specific procedures were prop­
erly followed in the case before the 
court."). · 
· 
69 United States v. Two Bulls, 918 
F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990) (adqpting Castro 
approach), vacated en brui'c, dismissed 
as inoot after defendant's death, 925 
F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991) .. 
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eva ted standard" as. "even m.ore 
stringent than that in Frye ."70 · 
The post -Daubert developments 
are difficultto categorize. Several 
Frye jurisdictions have addressed 
this issue. In People v. Wesley, 11 the 
New YorkCourt of Appeals affirmed 
Frye but held that case-specific er­
rors generally go to the weight of the 
evidence; to its admissibility. As the 
highest court in New York, Wesley 
overrules Castro� In rejecting the 
three-pronged test, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals adopted an inter­
mediate approach: "Although these 
particularized challenges ordinarily 
will go to the weight of the evi­
dence rather than its admissibility, 
the trial judge retains discretion to 
exclude evidence if it is sn unreli­
able that it would not be helpful to 
the factfinder;"72 
Even after Daubert, the Eighth 
Circuit in United States v. Martinez13 
continued to impose this "plus" r�­
quirement: 
We believe that the reliability 
inquiry set forth in Daubert man­
dates that there be a pr elimin ary 
showing that the expert properly 
perform�d a reliabie methodology 
in arriving at his 6pinion .... In 
order to dete rmine whether scien­
tific testimony is reliable, the court 
must conclude that the· testimony 
was derived from the application 
70 United States v. Jalcobetz, 955 F.2d 
786, 794--95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 
u.s. 837 (1992). . 
71 People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 
458 (N.Y. 1993). 
72 Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221, 
235 (Md. 1996). 
73 United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 
1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993). · 
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of a reliable methodology or prin­
ciple in the particular case. 
Thus, we conclude that the court 
should make an initial inquiry into 
the particular expert's application 
of the scientific principle or meth­
odolog)'in questiQp. ThJ::cgl]rt 
should require the testifying expert 
to provide affidavits attesting that 
he properly performed the proto� 
cols involved in DNA profiling.74 
In United Stdtes v. Galbreth/5 a. 
federal district court also discussed 
the Daubert "plus" issue in a poly­
graph case: "It is not entirely clear 
whether Daubert requires as a pre­
requisite to admissibility that the 
proponent establish the validity of 
lhe specific application of a scien­
tific technique."76 The court further 
. 74The Eighth Circuit later withdrew 
the first opinion and substituted a new 
opinion. The court's position on this is­
sue, however, does not appear to have 
changed. The court wrote: 
We believe that the reliability in­
quiry set forth in Daubert mandates 
that there be a preliminary showing 
that the expert properly performed a 
reliable methodology in arriving at 
his opinion . . . . [Daubert] suggests 
that the inquiry extends beyond sim­
ply the reliability of the principles 
or methodologies in the abstract. In 
order to determine whether scientific 
testimony is reliable, the court must 
conclude that the testimony was de-
. rived from the application of a reli­
able methodology or principle in the 
particular case. 
United States v. Martinez, 1993 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 31026, *21-22 (8th Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 734 
(1994). 
75 United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. 
Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995). 
76 Id. at 880--81. 
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remarked: "[A]fter reviewing the 
case law addressing this issue in the 
context of other forensic laboratory 
techniques and after careful consid­
eration of the testimony presented 
at the hea.ring regarding the poly­
graph technique, the Court holds that 
in the context of polygraph evi­
dence, such scrutiny is imperative to 
a faithful application of Daubert."77 
Accordingly, the court went on to 
rule "that in addition to establishing 
the scientific validity of the poly­
graph technique in the abstract, the 
proponent of the proposed testimony 
must also prove that the specific 
examination was conducted prop­
erly by a competent examiner."78 
Texas has also followed this ap­
proach: "To be considered reliable, 
evidence of a scientific theory must 
satisfy the following three criteria: 
(a) the underlying theory must be 
valid; (b) the technique applying the 
theory must be valid; and (c) the tech­
nique must have been properly applied 
on the occasion in question."79 In ad­
dition, Texas has required the propo­
nent of novel scientific evidence to 
establish its reliability by clear and 
convincing evidence.80 
!iJaJuber['s "�e�om<ed" SiJ:allll[l]anr<Dl 
A related issue concerns the ex­
tent to which Daubert lowers the 
barriers to admissibility. At the time 
Daubert was decided in 1993, many 
commentators interpreted the 
Court's opinion as replacing the 
7 7  Id. at  881. 
78 Id. at 882. 
79 Campbell v. State, 910 S.W.2d 
475, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en 
bane) (citing Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 
568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). 
llO Id. 
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Frye general acceptance standard 
with a more liberal stan9ard of ad­
missibility. Passages in the opinion 
support this view. For example, the 
Court commented: 
Given the Rules' permissive back­
drop and their inClusion of a spe­
cific rule on expert testimony that 
does. not menti,on "general accep­
tance,'' the assertion that the Rules 
SOI!lehow assimiiatei:l Frye is un­
cmivincing. Frye made "general 
acceptance" the exclusive test for 
admitting expert scientific testi­
mony. That ·austere. stand:ud, ·a b-
. seritfrom and incompatible with 
the Feoeral Rules of Evidence, 
sho�ld. no( be appli�d 1n federal 
· trials. 81 
· 
· 
Some later cases embraced this po­
sltioi:t'.For example, in United States 
v. Bmids,82 the Sixth Circuit ruled: 
·"We find that the DNA testimony 
easily meets the more liberal test set 
out :b:y the' Supreme Court in 
Daitbert."83 Sirmlady; the Second 
Circuithas written: "[B]y loosening 
the strictures on scientific evi­
dence set by Frye, Diiube'rt rein-
forces the idea that there should be 
a presumption of admissibility."84 
The polygraph cases illustrate this 
development. The Fifth Circuit has 
81 509 U.S. at 589. 
82 United States v. Bonds, 12 F. 3d 
540 (6th Cir. 1993). 
83 Id. at 568. See also United States 
v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663,668-69 (2d Cir. 
1995) ("The Federal Rule.s of Evidence, 
although concededly more liberal than 
the Frye test, still require a determina­
tion that the proffered �cientific evi­
dence is both relevant and reliable."). 
84 Bora wick v. Shay, 68 F. 3d 597, 
610 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 1869 (1996). 
observed that "the rationale under­
lying this circuifs per se rule agamst 
admitting polygraph evidence did 
not survive Daubert."85 The court 
went on to state: 
[W)e do not now hold that poly­
graph examinations are scientifi­
cally valid or that they will always 
as�i'st the trier of fact. We merely 
remove the obstacle of the per se 
rule. against admissibility, which 
was based on antiquated concepts 
about the technical ability of the 
polygraph and legal precepts [the 
Frye rule] that have been expressly 
overruled by the.Supreme Cou ri.86 
There is, however, an alternative 
interpretation of Daubert. Admit­
tedly, Daubert ovetruled F1ye and 
adopted a different standard of ad­
missibility-but not necessarily a 
less stringent one. Daubert required 
the trial judge to make an indepen­
dent assessment of reliability. The 
Court wrote: 
[l]n order to qualify as "scientific 
knowledge," an inference or asser­
tion must be derived by the scien­
tific method. Proposed testimony 
must be supported by appropriate 
validation-i.e., "good grounds," 
based on what is known. In short, 
the requirement that an expert's 
testimony pertain to "scientific 
knowledge" establishes a standard 
of evidentiary reliability_B? 
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In addition, the trial court's admis­
sibility determination· "entails a 
preliminary assessment of whether 
85 United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 
428, 429 (5th Cir. 1995). 
86 Id. at 434. 
87 Daubert 509 U.S. at 590. 
CR�M!NAL lAW BULLETif\l 
the reasoning or methodology un­
derlying the testimony is scientifi­
cally valid and of whether that 
reasoning or methodology properly 
can be applied to the facts in issue."33 
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,39 
the United States Supreme Court's 
only decision interpreting Daubert, 
provides some ·tunhet�elabt>tation. 
Joiner alleged that exposure to PCBs 
had caused his cancer, but the trial 
court had excluded the plaintiff's 
expert testimony on causation as un­
supported speculation. The Supreme 
Court was asked to determine the · 
standard of appellate review. The 
Court adopted an abuse-of-discre­
tion standard for reviewing a trial 
court's admissibility decision under 
Daubert. In one passage, the Court 
wrote: "[W]hile the Federal Rules 
of Evidence allow district courts to 
admit a somewhat broader range of 
scientific testimony tha..11 would have 
been admissible under Frye, they 
leave in place the 'gatekeeper' role 
of the trial judge in screening such 
evidence."90 Again, the ambiguity of 
Daubert is repeated; a "broader 
range" of testimony is admissible, 
but the trial court's gatelceeping 
function is also emphasized. More­
over, the trial court in Joiner had 
excluded the plaintiff's expert testi­
mony, i.e., applying a rather de­
manding admissibility standard. 
In addition, the Supreme Court 
elaborated on a sentence in Daubert 
that had proved troublesome. In 
Daubert the Court had written that 
the "focus, or course, must be solely 
on principles and methodology, not 
on the conclusions that they gener­
ate."91 The plaintiff argued that the 
88 Id. at 592-93. 
89 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 
S. Ct. 512 (1997). 
90Id. at 517. 
91 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
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district court had ened because it · 
had disagreed with the conclusions 
(not the methods) that the experts 
had drawn from the scientific stud­
ies. The Court responded to this ar­
gument by noting that: 
[C]onclusions and methodology 
are not entirely distinct from one 
another. Trained experts s;ommonly 
extrapolate from existing data. But 
nothing in either Daubert or the 
Federal Rules of Evidence requires 
a district court to admit opinion 
evidence which is connected to 
existing data only by the ipse dixit 
of the expert.' A court may conclude 
that there is simply too great an 
analytical gap between the data and 
the opinion proffered.92 
Here, again, the district court had not 
applied a lax standard; it had scruti­
nized the underlying scientific ba­
sis (i.e., animal and epidemiological 
studies) of the experts' opinions. As 
the Supreme Court noted, the ani­
mal studies were "dissimilar" to the 
facts presented in this litigation and 
the epidemiological studies "were 
not a sufficient basis for the experts' 
opinions."93ln sum, Joiner does not 
seem to resolve the "relaxed" stan­
dard issue. 
The view that Daubert does not 
adopt a lax standard finds support 
in recent cases dealing with ques­
tioned document and hair compari­
sons. 
Q\Uies�ioll1lte<dl Do�t:lUimtell1l�S 
In United States v. Starzecpyzel94 
a federal district court concluded 
92 loiner, 118 S. Ct. at 519. 
93 Id. at 518. 
94 United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 
F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D. N.Y. 1995). 
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that "the testimony at the Daubert 
hearing frrinly established that fo­
rensic document exarriination, de­
spite the existence of a certification 
program, professional journals and 
other trappings of science, cannot, 
after Daubert, be regarded as 'sci­
entific ., .. Icpowledge."' In addition, 
"while scientific principles may re­
late to_aspec�s ofhanciwriting analy­
sis, they haye little or nothing to do 
with the day-to-day tasks performed 
by [Forensic Document Examiners] 
. . .  [T]his attenuated relationship 
does not transform the FDE into a 
scientist. "95 - .-
. The court ruled that Daubert ap­
plied only to expert testimony that 
is "scientific " within the meaning of 
Federal Rule 702. But Rule 702 also 
permits the'adnrission ofexpert tes­
timony based on "technical " or 
"other sp�cialized knowledge, " and 
in the court's view, Daubert did not 
apply to nonsCientific eJ(perts fall­
ing within tb_ese categories. The 
court went on to hold, �owever, that 
the Rule 702 requirements limiting 
expert testimony to that which as� 
sists the trier of fact and is proffered 
by. a qualified expert must neverthe­
less be satisfied: "[T]his court con­
cludes that adequate guidance can 
be found within Rule 702 to conduct 
a meaningful inquiry into the reli­
ability of the expertise claimed by 
FDEs."9 6 Mter the court found the 
testimony to be sufficiently reliable, 
it considered the risk of unfair preju­
dice. Because of FDE's use of terms 
such as "laboratory " and references 
to authorities with titles that may 
contain the words "science " or "sci­
entific, " there was a risk that jurors 
95 Id. at 1041. 
96 Id. at 1043. 
may bestow upon FDE's the aura 
of the infallibility- of scientists. 
Moreover, use of anine-level scale 
ofprobability to express aii opin� 
ion regarding genuineness ap­
peared, in the court's view, to be 
nrisleadingly precise. Such overly 
fine distinctions are inappropriate in 
forensic document examination 
where it is conceded that conclu­
sions are drawn, in large part, on 
subjective criteria.97 
These problems do not preclude 
admission because several proce­
dures can attenuate these risks. The 
first is ajury instruction stating that 
"FDEs offer practiCal rather than 
scientific -expertise.' 9 8 Second, the 
court may restrict testimony relat­
ing to the existence ofthe nine�level 
scale. Finally, the defense is entitled 
''to attack the reliability of forensic 
document examination, ... to attack 
the expertise of each testifying FDE, 
[and] to introduce the testimony of 
their own,FDE. "99 
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Later cases affJIIiled this :view. In 
United States v. Velasquez, 100 the 
Third Circuit ruled tl1atthe trial court 
"erred as a matter of. law in denying 
the. defense the opportunity to criti:- · 
cize the standards employed in that 
field of expertise. " The expert would 
97 Id. at 1048. 
98 Id. at 1049. The court attached a 
draft jury instruction to the end of the 
opinion. Id. at 1050-5L · 
99 Id. at 1050. 
100 United States v. Vt<lasquez, 64 
F.3d 844, 848 (3d Cir, 1995). See also 
United States v. Ruth, 42 ML730, 732 
(Army Ct. App. 1995) (expert handwrit­
ing testimony admissible under Rule 
702 as "technical, and other specialized 
knowledge" even if it does not satisfy 
Daubert) (appointment of defense ex� 
pert denied) aff'd, 46 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 
1997). 
' 
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have testified that "handwriting 
analysis is not a valid field qf scien­
tific expertise becauseithtcks stan­
dards to guide experts in weighing 
the match or non-match of particu­
lar handwriting characteristics. " 101 
In United States v. Jones, 102 the Sixth 
Gircuit"·wrote"'��!In�shoft,.,-HJl_ett 
handwriting analysis is a field of 
expertise under the Feder� Rules of 
Evidence. This decision, however, 
does not guarantee the reliability or 
admissibility of this type of testi­
mony in a particular case." 
·Hair- Comparisons-
In Williamson v. R�ynolds, 103 a 
federal habeas,corpus cll,Se, _an ex­
pert testified that hair samples were 
"microscopically consistent.'; How­
ever, the "expert did not explain 
which of the 'approximately' 25 
characteristics were consistent, any 
standards for determinmg \Vhether 
the samples were consistent, how 
many persons .could be e)(pected to 
share this same. c;ombination of char­
acteristics, or lmw he arrived at his 
conclusions." Moreover, �1t]his 
court has been unsuccessful in its 
attempts to locate any indication that 
expert hair comparison. testimony 
meets any of. the requirements of 
Daubert."104 The court further ob­
served: "Although the hair expert 
may' have followed procedures ac-
101 64 F.3d at 846. 
102 United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 
1147, 1160 (6th Cir. 1997). 
. 
103 Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. 
Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995). 
104 Id. at 1557. 
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cepted in the community of hair ex­
perts, the human hair comparison 
results in this case were, non�the­
less, scientifically unreliable. "ro5 Fi­
nally, the prosecutor exacerbated the 
problem by stating in the closing 
argument, "[T]here's a match. " The 
state_courtals.o)nisint�rpreted the 
evidence, . wrl.ting that the "hair 
evidence placed [Petitioner] <:!-t .the 
decedent' s apartn)ent." Th� 
"prosecutor's-mischaracterization 
of the hair evidence misled. the 
jury .... " 106 
The Tenth Cll:cuit reversed on the 
ground thatdue'process, not Daubert, 
was the standard in habeas cases.107 
Subsequently, an·Indiana appel­
late court wrote: ".[l]he State mis­
takenly believed that a Daubert 
foundation·was only required for 
novel scientific techniques, and thus 
did not attempt io· hty the requisite 
foundation of evidentiary reliability 
[for hair comparison evidence]. " 108 
Conclusion 
In sum, it is too_ ecrrly to predict 
the long-r�ge impact of Pt!-ubert. 
As Daubert moves into its fifth year, 
the courts are still struggling to de­
fine its scope. Moreover, the state 
courts are in the process of deciding 
whether the Daubert standard 
should replace Frye. 
105 Id. at 1558. 
106 Id. at 1557. But see McCarty v. 
State, 904 P.2d 110, 125 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1995). 
107 Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 
1508, (lOth Cir. 1997). 
108 McGrew v. State, 673 N.E.2d 787, 
802 (Ind. App. 1996). 
